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Abstract 
Time-series analyses suggest that income shocks are fairly persistent. This has implications 
for the intergenerational risk-sharing effects of pay-as-you-go (paygo) social security 
programs. By means of a simple stochastic specification, we derive theoretically how the 
variance of individuals’ lifetime income depends on the degree of persistence in the income 
shocks and the magnitude of the paygo program. A low or medium degree of persistence 
ensures that properly scaled paygo programs provide intergenerational diversification of 
income risk. On the other hand, a somewhat higher degree of persistence may well imply that 
paygo programs in fact increase the exposure to income shocks. Taking into account that it is 
hard to reject that income shocks are permanent (and income follows a random walk) in many 
countries, we can not exclude that many individuals in the OECD area do face a heightened 
exposure to income risk as a consequence of the actual social security programs financed on a 
paygo basis. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A main conclusion in a couple of seminal papers on the design and effects of social security 
programs under uncertainty is that paygo financing provides intergenerational diversification 
of individuals’ income risk, see Gordon and Varian (1988) and Enders and Lapan (1982, 
1993). The basic intuition is that paygo financing implies that the working generation shares 
their income shocks with the retired generation through the transfer of parts of their income to 
the pensioners. Eventually, this working generation becomes the new retired generation and 
must in return share the subsequent income shocks with the next generation. Ex-ante this 
leads to a reduced life- income risk for all generations.  
A closer look at the analyses leading to the favorable risk sharing conclusion reveals 
that they rely on specific stochastic specifications of income (or productivity which in turn 
determines income). The papers of Enders and Lapan as well as those of Gordon and Varian 
all assume that income shocks have zero persistence and consequently that trend income is 
deterministic. Taking into account that the research on the stochastic properties of trend 
output growth and the degree of persistence in output, income and productivity shocks in 
general has lead to fairly ambiguous conclusions – and does not support a zero persistence 
assumption – we may argue that studies of the risk sharing effects of paygo schemes should 
be based on a more generalized stochastic specification of income. At the outset we note as an 
extreme example that a unit-root assumption, which implies that all shocks are permanent, 
turns out to remove the scope for intergenerational income risk sharing completely. In such a 
case, no paygo scheme or alternative intergenerational tax-transfer scheme can reduce the 
exposure of each generation to its own income shock. Consequently, this note analyzes the 
intergenerational risk sharing effects of paygo schemes in a framework that allows any 
specification of the degree of persistence in the income shocks.       
 During the last two decades the testing for stochastic trends in output and other 
macroeconomic variables has focused on unit-root testing and assessments of the degree of 
persistence in the data. As surveyed by Balke (1991), the early contributions to this debate 
mainly concluded in favor of the unit root property, see for example Nelson and Plosser 
(1982) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989). Thus, shocks seemed to be permanent and the 
trend stochastic. More recent contributions yield more ambiguous results. A basic insight 
highlighted by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990) and also discussed in a useful way by 
Romer (2001, section 4.8), is that it is nearly impossible to distinguish between a stochastic 
trend and a deterministic trend in combination with a cyclical component that features a very 
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high degree of persistence. Thus, while evidence of stochastic trend remains mixed, we may 
still conclude that data do not support an assumption of zero persistence in output, income and 
productivity. It seems fair to conjecture that the degree of persistence is significantly above 
zero but still maybe somewhat below unity (where unity indicates 100 per cent persistence -  
i.e. permanent shocks) . Such a view seems to be reflected in the literature dealing with 
calibrated stochastic business cycle models. Nearly “all” such models seem to assume that the 
degree of persistence in productivity shocks is very high and amounts to values just barely 
below unity, see for example the 0.95 persistence parameter assumed by Freeman and 
Kydland (2000). 
 This note contributes to the literature on social security schemes under uncertainty. 
The basic income risk sharing conclusion of Gordon and Varian (1988) and Enders and Lapan 
(1982, 1993) has recently been debated by Thøgersen (1998), Borgman (2002) and Wagener 
(2003). These papers argue that the income risk sharing conclusion - from an ex-ante 
perspective (at the time of enactment of the program) - hinges on a fixed contribution rate 
feature of the actual paygo system. If the system rather features a fixed replacement rate, 
individuals will face increased income risk. Neither of these papers questions the assumption 
of zero persistence in the income shocks, however.  
This paper is also related to a small literature that studies the design of social security 
systems by means of a portfolio choice approach see Merton (1983), Dutta et al. (2000) and 
Matsen and Thøgersen (2001). These studies interpret a paygo system as a non-marketable 
asset with an implicit stochastic return equal to the rate of economic growth. It turns out that 
the analyses in these papers do not capture the zero persistence property of the papers by 
Gordon and Varian and by Enders and Lapan - but rather resort to the alternative extreme 
assumption of 100 per cent persistence. Still, this assumption is not discussed in any detail. 
Because they focus on the optimal split between investments in financial assets (by means of 
a funded pension system) and implicit investments in the paygo “quasi-asset”, the 
implications of alternative assumptions regarding the degree of persistence in the income 
shocks are not highlighted. 
 The next section presents a simple overlapping generations model, which essentially is 
a slightly adjusted version of the model suggested by Gordon and Varian (1988) and also 
utilized by Thøgersen (1998). The innovation in this paper is that the specification of the 
stochastic income process is altered in order to capture any assumption about the degree of 
persistence, i.e. an exogenous persistence parameter can capture any value between zero (no 
persistence) and one (permanent shocks).  Section 3 presents our theoretical analysis of the 
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intergenerational income risk sharing effects of paygo social security systems. We derive 
closed form theoretical expressions that capture how the variance of individuals’ net life 
income is determined by the size of the paygo system and the degree of persistence in the 
income shocks. Simple numerical calculations suggest that the paygo pension systems in 
many OECD economies may well lead to an increase in individuals’ exposure to income risk 
– provided that we accept the view that income shocks are highly persistent. Section 4 offers 
some final remarks. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a stylized overlapping generations model that is a version of the model analyzed 
by Gordon and Varian (1988) and also utilized by Thøgersen (1998) and Borgman (2002). For 
simplicity both the rate of population growth and the real interest rate are equal to zero. The 
representative individual in any given generation t (t = 0,1,2,....) has a two-period life cycle. 
In the first period of life (period t) he supplies inelastically one unit of labor, receives a 
stochastic gross wage given by tw  and pays a social security contribution tt . In the second 
period of life (period t+1), he is retired and receives a public pension benefit 1+tp  (see below). 
There are no bequests. 
 The development of the gross wage is described by an autoregressive model of the 
form: 
 
(1) ( ) ,...3,2,1,010 ="+-+= - twwww ttt eb . 
 
Here 0w  is the fixed wage in the initial period 0 and the parameter b  measures the degree of 
persistence in the wage shocks ( 10 ££ b ). The random shock te  is serially uncorrelated and 
characterized by a zero mean and a variance, 2s , that is constant over time. We can imagine 
that the wage shocks reflect underlying technology shocks.   
We observe that the extreme case of zero persistence, 0=b , implies that 
 
(2) tt ww e+= 0 ,    
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which means that the wage is characterized by a fixed (and flat) trend equal to 0w . In the 
more general case of 10 £< b , we can rewrite (1) as  
 
(3) å
=
-+=
t
s
s
st
t ww
1
0 eb . 
 
Clearly, as long as b  < 1, the effect of a given shock gradually dies out. It also follows from 
(1) that the case of 1=b , i.e. the other extreme case, yields a random-walk. This implies that 
shocks are permanent and equation (3) simplifies to 
 
(4) å
=
+=
t
s
st ww
1
0 e . 
 
The net lifetime income of a representative individual in generation t is  
 
(5) 1++-= tttt wy pt . 
 
Following Gordon and Varian (1988), Thøgersen (1998), Shiller (1999) and Borgman (2002), 
we assume that the expected utility of the representative generation t individual is given by 
the mean-variance specification 
 
(6) [ ] [ ])()( ttt yVarvyEuU -= , 
 
where 0>¢u  and 0<¢v . This specification allows a fruitful discussion of intergenerational 
risk sharing, while issues related to consumption smoothing within each generation’s life-span 
are disregarded per se. We note that the argument in the ut ility function could equivalently be 
specified as consumption - when consumption takes place in the second period only, see Ball 
and Mankiw (2001) and Gordon and Varian. 
The sole objective of the government is to run a paygo social security system.1 
Recalling that there is no population growth and disregarding both other public expenditures 
                                                 
1 As discussed by Gordon and Varian (1988), we may of course imagine various sorts of complicated income 
transfer systems between many or “all” future generations. We consider only straightforward paygo systems, 
however, and do believe that such schemes are the most realistic ones when it comes to implementation. 
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and any initial public debt, we simply obtain tt pt = , i.e. the social security contribution from 
the representative member of the young generation in period t must be equal to the pension 
benefit to the representative old in the same period. Defining g  as a fixed contribution rate, 
10 ££ g , we have that 
 
(7) ttt w pgt == . 
 
Using (7) and (5), we obtain 
 
(8) 1)1( ++-= ttt wwy gg . 
 
 
3. Paygo programs and ex-ante risk sharing 
 
Focusing exclusively on ex-ante intergenerational risk sharing, we imagine that the 
government in the initial period 0, before any wage shocks have been revealed, implements a 
paygo program by means of a specific choice of g .  This ex-ante (or “as of the time of 
enactment of the program”) perspective is common in the literature on the effects of social 
security on intergenerational risk sharing and adopted in several papers, see for example 
Gordon and Varian (1988), Enders and Lapan (1982, 1993), Thøgersen (1998), Borgman 
(2002), Shiller (1999) and Ball and Mankiw (2001).2 Ball and Mankiw interpret this 
perspective as “Rawlsian”, i.e. the representative individuals from the various generations are 
present behind a “veil of ignorance” and do not know whether their generation will 
experience a favourable or disappointing wage shock.  
 We immediately observe from (1) that 00 )( wwE t =  for all t = 1,2,.... Thus, it follows 
from (8) that any g , even the benchmark case of 0=g  (no program), implies that 
00 )( wyE t = . Given the utility function in (8), the period 0 expected welfare effects of any 
paygo program are therefore solely related to the effect on )(0 tyVar . This reflects our 
assumption of a zero real interest rate as well as a zero population growth rate. Therefore, as 
of period 0 there is no expected intergenerational re-distribution to the initial generation from 
                                                 
2  A useful discussion of the validity of this ex-ante perspective versus an alternative ex-post perspective is 
provided by Wagener (2002), see also Ball and Mankiw (2001) and Sinn (1996). 
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future generations as a consequence of the paygo program when the real interest rate exceeds 
the rate of growth. This effect is well understood and deliberately suppressed here, allowing 
us to focus exclusively on intergenerational risk sharing effects. 
 We first consider )(0 tyVar in the benchmark case of no paygo program ( 0=g ). In this 
case t
B
t wy = , see (8), where superscript B refers to Benchmark, i.e. no paygo program. Using 
(2), (3) and (4), we obtain 
 
(9a) 20 )( s=
B
tyVar    for 0=b , 
 
(9b) å
=
-=
t
s
stB
tyVar
1
2)(2
0 )( sb    for  10 £< b , 
 
(9c) å
=
==
t
s
B
t tyVar
1
22
0 )( ss    for  1=b . 
 
 Our task is now to examine how an introduction of a paygo program ( 10 £< g ) alters 
)(0 tyVar . We consider the extreme cases first. If 0=b , (2) and (8) imply 
 
(10) 10 )1( ++-+= tt
paygo
t wy geeg , 
 
where superscript paygo refers to the existence of a paygo program. From (10) we derive 
 
(11) 22220 )1()( sgsg +-=
paygo
tyVar . 
 
We immediately observe that any ]1,0Îg  implies that )()()( 200 s=< Btpaygot yVaryVar , see 
(9a). Hence, a paygo program provides intergenerational income risk sharing in the case of 
0=b  because each income shock is shared between two succeeding generations. This is the 
essential risk-sharing conclusion in the analyses of Gordon and Varian (1988), Enders and 
Lapan (1982, 1993) and Thøgersen (1998). It also follows from (11) that 2
1=g  implies a 
minimum value of )(0
paygo
tyVar  equal to 
2
2
1 s . Because )(0 tyE  is not altered by the paygo 
program, 2
1=g  is also optimal from an ex-ante perspective for all generations. 
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 The alternative extreme case of 1=b  yields opposite conclusions. From (4) and (8) 
we obtain 
 
(12) å
=
+++=
t
s
ts
paygo
t wy
1
10 gee , 
 
which in turn implies that 
 
(13) 2220 )( sgs += tyVar
paygo
t . 
 
Looking at (9c) and (13), we observe that 2200 )()( sg=-
B
t
paygo
t yVaryVar , which means that 
any paygo program ( 10 £< g ) raises the exposure to income risk for all generations. The 
intuition is that an income shock which hits a given generation t, te , also hits the next 
generation t+1 to a full extent, i.e. we have that 111 +-+ ++= tttt ww ee  when 1=b . In effect 
the paygo program therefore on the one hand taxes away parts of generation t’s exposure to 
te  but on the other hand transfers back the same exposure to te . In addition the paygo 
program involves an exposure to 1+te  as well. Consequently, the total exposure to income risk 
increases. Clearly, no paygo program ( 0=g ) is optimal from an ex-ante perspective when 
1=b . 
 Turning to the general case of 10 £< b , we derive from (3) and (8) that 
 
(14a) ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
++÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
+-= åå
+
=
-+
=
-
1
1
1
0
1
0)1(
t
s
s
st
t
s
s
stpaygo
t wwy ebgebg  . 
 
This expression can be rewritten as 
 
(14b) [ ] 1
1
0 )1(1 +
=
- +--+= å t
t
s
s
stpaygo
t wy geebbg , 
 
and it follows that 
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(15) [ ] å
=
- +--=
t
s
stpaygo
tyVar
1
22)(222
0 )1(1)( sgbsbg . 
 
From (9b) and (15) we now obtain 
 
(16) ( )[ ] å
=
- ----=-ºD
t
s
stpaygo
t
B
t yVaryVart
1
22)(222
00 )1(11)()()( sgbsbg , 
  
and the issue is whether 0)( >D t , implying that a paygo program leads to intergenerational 
risk sharing for a given generation t. We first observe that )(tD is proportional to 2s . More 
importantly, we observe from (16) that the first term on the RHS is strictly positive because 
the expression in the brackets is strictly between 0 and 1 when 10 £< g  and 10 << b . This 
captures that the paygo program reduces the exposure of generation t to the shocks 
teee ,...,, 21 . The second term on the RHS of (16) is negative, however, and captures that the 
paygo program exposes generation t to 1+te .  
 It follows that the sign of )(tD  is indeterminate and depends on t as well as on the 
magnitude of g  and b . The relationship between D  and t is of course due to the term 
å
=
- º
t
s
st t
1
)(2 )(mb  in the first term on the RHS. Because 0>¶
¶
t
m , we have that 0>¶
D¶
t . 
Accordingly, a paygo system is more likely to offer intergenerational income risk sharing for 
generations in the distant future (a high t) than for generations closer to the initial period 0 
(for given values of g  and b ). This reflects our ex-ante “as of the time of the enactment of 
the program” time perspective. When t increases and b >0, the paygo program removes parts 
of more shocks (the first term on the RHS of (16)), while the additional risk created by the 
paygo program is not altered (the last term on the RHS of (16)). 
Looking closer at (16), it is also straightforward (but somewhat cumbersome) to verify 
that 0<¶
D¶
b , see the appendix. Thus, more persistent income shocks monotonically reduce the 
scope for income risk sharing by means of paygo programs. Having shown above that paygo 
programs always imply risk sharing for 0=b  and always increase all generations’ income 
risk exposure for 1=b , we may stress three general insights: i) For fairly low persistence in 
the income shocks, a paygo program leads to risk sharing for all generations. The gains in 
terms of a reduced variance as measured by )(tD increase for later generations. ii) For a very 
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high degree of persistence, a paygo scheme may increase the risk exposure for all generations. 
Early generations are worst off. iii) For a medium-high degree of persistence, early 
generations may face increased exposure to income risk, while later generations may gain. 
The numerical calculations depicted in Table 1 illustrate these insights. For the given 
magnitude of the paygo program, 2
1=g , we observe that the finding of an increased income 
risk exposure (i.e. a negative value of )(tD ) requires a pretty high b -value. 
 
 
Table 1: Calculation of ?(t) for selected values of ß  and t - when 2
1=?  and 1s 2 = .  
 
 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 t = 10 
b  = 0.1 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 
b  = 0.2 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
b  = 0.5 0.19 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 
b  = 0.8 –0.06 0.06 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.27 
b  = 0.9 –0.15 –0.07 –0.01 0.04 0.08 0.20 
b  = 0.95 –0.20 –0.16 –0.12 –0.08 –0.05 0.07 
b  = 0.99 –0.24 –0.23 –0.22 –0.21 –0.20 –0.16 
 
 
 
Utilizing the formula for a finite geometric sequence, we have that å
=
-
-
-
=º
t
s
t
stt
1
2
2
)(2
1
1
)(
b
b
bm , 
which implies that )(tm  will approach 21
1
b-
 as t increases. Consequently, it follows from (16) 
that 
 
(17) ( )[ ] 222
2
2
1
1
)1(11)(
lim
sgs
b
bg -
-
---=D
¥®
t
t
. 
As illustrated in Table 1, )(tD approaches its limit fast for low and medium values of b .  
 It is also interesting to derive a condition that ensures that the paygo system leads to 
intergenerational risk sharing, i.e. 0)( >D t . It follows from (16), or more directly from (A-2) 
in the appendix, that 0)( >D t  requires that 
 
(18) 
)1()1)(1(
)1(2
2
2
bbb
b
g
+---
-
<
t
t
. 
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A quick look at this condition confirms that there is no scope for risk sharing by means of a 
paygo program when 1=b  (no g in the interval ]1,0  implies 0)( >D t ), while any paygo 
program leads to risk sharing when 0=b  (any g in the interval ]1,0  implies 0)( >D t ). More 
generally, a higher b  or a lower t will both reduce the maximum magnitude of a paygo system 
that implies risk sharing, i.e. the term on the RHS of (18) will approach 0. Not surprisingly, 
the opposite cases, a lower b  or a higher t, will imply that the term on the RHS of (18) 
approaches 1. 
 We have seen that the effect of a paygo system on the variance of individuals’ lifetime 
income varies across generations when 10 << b , i.e. D is an increasing function of t. 
Moreover, it is also straightforward from (16) to verify that g¶
D¶ depends on t. This implies that 
it is not possible to derive a socially optimal size of the paygo system without resorting to 
more specific assumptions about the appropriate weighting of the effects for the present and 
various future generations. In this context it is interesting to note that the property 0>¶
D¶
t  
implies that the value of g, which is optimal for the initial generation t = 1, actually involves 
larger gains for the succeeding generations. Consequently, optimization on behalf of 
generation t is socially optimal according to a maximin criterion. Adopting this concept of 
optimality, we note that (16) implies 
 
(19) ( )[ ] 2222)1(11)1( sgsbg ----=D , 
 
and in turn we derive the optimal magnitude of the paygo system as 
 
(20) 
2
*
)1(1
1
b
b
g
-+
-
= . 
 
Table 2 illustrates how *g , the magnitude of the paygo system that leads to the largest 
reduction in the variance of the life-time income of generation t = 1, is a declining and 
concave function of b . 
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Table 2: Calculation of *g  for selected values of b . 
 
 b  = 0 b  = 0.1 b  = 0.2 b  = 0.5 b  = 0.7 b  = 0.8 b  = 0.9 b=0.95 b=0.99 b  = 1 
*g : 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.28 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.00 
 
 
 
4. Final remarks 
 
Our analysis has demonstrated that the scope for intergenerational income risk sharing by 
means of a paygo social security program decreases with the degree of persistence in the 
income shocks. It turned out that the extreme case of permanent shocks actually increases all 
generations’ exposure to income risk, while a fairly high degree of persistence consistent with 
b  –values in, say, the range of 0.8 – 0.99 puts a severe limit on the size of the paygo programs 
that provide risk sharing. Taking into account that most OECD economies have large social 
security programs which are financed on a paygo basis, the potential existence of a high 
degree of persistence in the income shocks suggests that these programs in fact create 
additional exposure to income shocks for the individuals. 
 To what extent the theoretical insights of this paper are crucial for the design of social 
security programs, depends on the actual stochastic properties regarding income persistence. 
Unfortunately, it is fair to say that available empirical evidence is inconclusive. This partly 
reflects that the main bulk of empirical research in this area deals with tests of the unit root 
property and estimates of the degree of persistence in aggregate output measured as GDP (or 
GNP). Aggregate output per capita is a proxy for the income variable in our stylized 
theoretical model and it might have been better to consider the stochastic properties of the 
underlying productivity growth rate or to focus on the development of real wages. Still, we 
conjecture that aggregate output per capita is a good proxy for individual income when we 
recall the long run nature of our social security context.  
More important is probably the fact the empirical evidence in this field is mainly 
carried out in a short run business cycle setting. Based on annual (or quarterly) data it is, as 
discussed in the introduction, nearly impossible to distinguish between a stochastic trend (i.e. 
permanent shocks) and a deterministic trend in combination with a high degree of persistence 
in the income shocks. Quantitatively and in terms of our autoregressive specification of 
income, see (1), this means that annual data imply a b  –parameter which is either equal to 1 or 
alternatively barely below 1 (in approximately the range 0.90 – 0.99). As highlighted by 
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Romer (2001, section 4.8), data over somewhat longer horizons yield estimates that are not 
very precise. These findings are crucial for the interpretation of our theoretical results. Our 
social security setting implies that one period in our stylized overlapping generations model 
corresponds to approximately 25 years. Taking into account that a 0.95 persistence parameter 
in an annual setting implies “only” a 28.095.0 25 =  parameter in our overlapping generations 
setting (while a 0.99 annual persistence parameter implies a 0.78 parameter in our setting), it 
is obviously hard to reach a final verdict regarding the scope for intergenerational income risk 
sharing by means of paygo programs. On the one hand we must therefore conclude that the 
possibility of permanent or alternatively highly persistent income shock questions the validity 
of the traditional view that paygo programs provide intergenerational income risk sharing. On 
the other hand, current empirical evidence is also ambiguous about the possibility that the 
degree of income shocks is so high that it implies that paygo programs in fact create 
additional risk exposure.  
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Appendix 
 
In order to prove that 0<¶
D¶
b , we first rewrite (16) as 
 
(A-1) gmbgmb
gs
----=
D
)()1()()1(2
)( 2
2
tt
t
, 
 
which in turn implies that 
 
(A-2) 
b
b
mgmbgm
gs +
-
=--+-=
D
1
1
)(ˆ,)(ˆ)1()(ˆ2
)( 2
2
t
ttt
t
. 
 
We then obtain 
 
(A-3) ( ) ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
¶
¶
----=
¶
D¶
b
m
bgmggs
b
ˆ
)1(2ˆ2 . 
 
Using the definition 
b
b
m
+
-
=
1
1
)(ˆ
2t
t , see (A-2), we have 
 
(A-4) 
( ) ( )
2
212
)1(
1)1(2ˆ
b
bbb
b
m
+
--+
=
¶
¶ - ttt
. 
 
From (A-3) and (A-4) we obtain 
 
(A-5) [ ] )22)(1(2)1(2)1( 212 gbbbgb
b
-----+-=
¶
D¶ - ttt . 
 
Both terms on the RHS of (A-5) are strictly negative for 10 £< g  and 10 << b . Hence, we 
conclude that 0<¶
D¶
b . 
 
 14 
References 
 
 
Balke, N.S. (1991): “Modelling trends in macroeconomic time series”, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas Economic Review, May, 19-33. 
 
Ball, L. and N.G. Mankiw (2001): “Intergenerational risk sharing in the spirit of Arrow, 
Debreu, and Rawls, with applications to social security design”, NBER working paper no. 
8270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA. 
 
Borgman, C. (2002): “Labor income risk, demographic risk, and the design of wage- indexed 
social security”, manuscript, Freiburg University, Freiburg. 
 
Campbell, J.Y. and N.G. Mankiw (1989): “International evidence on the persistence of 
economic fluctuations”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 23, 319-334. 
 
Christiano, L.J. and M. Eichenbaum (1990): “Unit roots in real GNP: Do we know, and do we 
care?”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 32, 7-62. 
 
Dutta, J., S. Kapur and J.M. Orzag (2000): “A portfolio approach to the optimal funding of 
pensions”, Economics Letters, 69, 201-206. 
 
Enders, W. and H.P. Lapan (1982): “Social security taxation and intergenerational risk 
sharing”, International Economic Review, 23, 647-658. 
 
Enders, W. and H.P. Lapan (1993): “A model of first and second-best social security 
programs”, Journal of Economics, 7 (Suppl.), 65-90. 
 
Freeman, S. and F.E. Kydland (2000): “Monetary aggregates and output”, American 
Economic Review, 90, 1125-1135. 
 
Gordon, R.H. and H.R. Varian (1988): “Intergenerational risk sharing”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 37, 185-202. 
 
Matsen, E. and Ø. Thøgersen (2001): “Designing social security - A portfolio choice 
approach”, Discussion paper no. 21, Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration, Bergen. 
 
Merton, R.C. (1983): “On the role of social security as a means for efficient risk sharing in an 
economy where human capital is not tradable”, in: Z. Bodie and J.B. Shoven (eds.), Financial 
Aspects of the United States Pension System, The University of Chicago Press, 325-358. 
 
Nelson, C.R. and C.I. Plosser (1982): “Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time 
series: Some evidence and implications”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 20, 136-162. 
 
Romer, D. (2001), Advanced Macroeconomics, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Shiller, R.J. (1999): “Social security and intergenerational, intragenerational and international 
risk sharing”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series in Public Policy, 50, 165-204  
 
 15 
Sinn, H.W. (1996): “Social insurance, incentives and risk taking”, International Tax and 
Public Finance, 3, 259-280. 
 
Thøgersen, Ø. (1998): “A note on intergenerational risk sharing and the design of pay-as-you-
go pension programs”, Journal of Population Economics, 11, 373-378. 
 
Wagener, A. (2003): “Pensions as a portfolio problem: Fixed contribution rates vs. fixed 
replacement rates reconsidered”, Journal of Population Economics, 16, 111-134. 
 
 
 
